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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
fault16 The court concluded that problems as to the receipt of the
copy of the notice and petition which the Secretary of State is required
to mail the respondent do not affect the court's jurisdiction, but may
be grounds for opening a default judgment.106
DAMAGES
Damages: Where survival and wrongful death actions are combined,
medical and funeral expenses are allocated to former when estate is
responsible and to latter when distributees are responsible.
Where a decedent's personal injury actionl 8 has been combined 1 9
with a wrongful death action, separate verdicts are required,17 ° and
medical and funeral expenses must be allocated to one of the causes
of action. These expenses are allocated to the survival cause and thus
to the decedent's estate when "paid by the estate or for the payment
of which the estate is responsible. .. ;"171 they are allocated to the
wrongful death action and thus to the decedent's distributees when
"paid by the distributees, or for the payment of which any distributee
is responsible... ."172 When such expenses have not been paid prior to
trial or settlement, the court must determine who is responsible for
payment.
The Surrogate's Court, Kings County, was faced with this problem
in In re Estate of Jackson 73 At the time of trial, medical and funeral
bills exceeding $5000 remained unpaid. After the jury awarded re-
covery in each cause, allocation was essential because a lien in excess
of the total assets of the estate existed.1 4 Correct procedure would be
for the personal representative to advise in his account to the court
166 71 Misc. 2d at 843-44, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
167 Id. at 844, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 809. See Cascione v. Acme Equip. Corp., 23 App. Div.
2d 49, 258 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Ist Dep't 1965) (per curiam); Montulli v. Sherlo Realty, Inc., 37
Misc. 2d 655, 284 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962), af'd mem., 18 App. Div. 2d
1139, 239 N.Y.S.2d 864 (4th Dep't 1963).
108EPTL 11-3.3(a) limits the damages recoverable in such an action to those accruing
before death plus reasonable funeral expenses in appropriate cases. N.Y. Esr., Powms g
TRuSrs LAw § 11-3.3(a) (McKinney 1967).
169 Id. § 11-3.3(b)(1). The decedent's estate gets the benefit of the wrongful death rule
which makes contributory negligence a defense to be pleaded and proved by the defendant.
Id. § 11-3.2(b).
170d. § 11-3.3(b)(1).
171 Id. § 11-3.3(a).
172 Id. § 5-4.8. See Murphy v. New York C. & H.R.R., 88 N.Y. 445 (1882); Loeb v. Shel-
don Foster Supply Co., 243 App. Div. 740, 277 N.Y.S. 439 (2d Dep't 1935).
173 71 Misc. 2d 133, 335 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1972).
174 There are two basic reasons for allocation. First, the decedents debts are payable
only out of estate funds. Second, even if there are no estate debts, "[t]he same persons do
not necessarily share in the survival (pain and suffering) recovery and the wrongful death
recovery... Even when the same persons do share in each recovery, they do not share in
the same proportion." Id. at 134-35, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
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from which fund medical and funeral expenses are to be paid.175 In
the instant case, the petition allocated the expenses to the survival
action. The court, however, after inquiry of the trial court, upheld this
allocation. Noting that attorneys' compensation is not an element of
damages in either cause of action, the court further held that counsel
fees should be charged separately against each recovery.176
SUMMARY PROCEEDING
Summary proceeding: Landlord, by its excessive delay, forfeited right
to summary resolution of claims.
A summary proceeding under article 7 of the Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law provides an expeditious means for a
landlord to recover possession of his real property.177 Gramford Realty
Corp. v. Valentin'78 involved three summary nonpayment proceedings
by a landlord which had immediately ceased to demand rent after
acquiring an apartment building in June, 1971, and had billed its
tenants in June, 1972, for the total amount then due. The tenants, who
had paid nothing in the interim, were unable to pay. Although the
tenant's defense of equitable estoppel179 failed for lack of evidence,180
the New York City Civil Court, New York County, relying on its
inherent power to prevent injustice, dismissed the proceedings, without
prejudice, however, to an action to collect the accrued rents.18' The
court held that "by its excessive delay, the landlord ... forfeited the
right to resort to summary proceedings."' 82
175 Id. at 139, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
176 Id. at 134, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 590. See In re Estate of Bruno, 36 Misc. 2d 909, 233
N.YS&2d 913 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1962).
177 Cotignola v. Lieber, 34 App. Div. 2d 700, 701, 309 N.YS.2d 498, 499 (3d Dep't 1970)
(mem.); Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger, 41 Misc. 2d 988, 989, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
17871 Misc. 2d 784, 337 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
179 "The answer may contain any legal or equitable defense, or counter-claim." RPAPL
743. See Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger, 41 Misc. 2d 988, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y.C. Civ.
CL N.Y. County 1964). The tenants claimed that the landlord sought a means of removing
them, without the eviction certificate required by N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws tit. 23, § 51 et
seq. (McKinney App. 1969), by deliberately postponing rent collection until they were
unable to pay the accumulated rent due. The court, considering this contention, found
the tenants' reliance on Midman Realty Corp. v. Kane, 165 N.Y.L.J. 13, Jan. 20, 1971, at
19, col. 4 (N.Y. Civ. CL N.Y. County), to be misplaced. 71 Misc. 2d at 785, 337 N.Y.S.2d at
162. The tenants therein tendered the rent.
180 Leave of court is required for use of disclosure devices in special proceedings.
CPLR 408.
18171 Misc. 2d at 786, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 163. The tenants may also raise the defense of
equitable estoppel in such an action. For rents coming due after the commencement of the
summary proceedings, the landlord may bring new summary proceedings against the tenants
after appropriate demand. Id.
182Id. The court distinguished the requirement of RPAPL 711(2) that a landlord's
[Vol. 47:580
